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Abstract
The diagnosis of mental illness has sometimes been a controversial issue due to
concerns about reliability and validity of diagnosis. Current methods focus on the categorical
assessment of presented symptoms, however, the assessment of the factors leading up to and
correlated with mental illness could be a more helpful tool for identifying mental illness itself.
The position of this paper is that an analysis of these factors and in particular the integration of
the sociological perspective could lead to a better method of diagnosis and understanding of
mental illness. A brief overview of the three primary models of mental illness is discussed first
followed by an analysis of literature around the benefits and drawbacks to the dominant models
and diagnosis of mental illness. Following this, a continued analysis of previous literature around
alternatives to categorical assessment of mental illness is explored and discussed.
Keywords: Mental Illness, Diagnosis, Alternatives, Categorical, Symptoms
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Diagnosis of Mental Illness Today and Tomorrow
A literary review of the current methods, drawbacks, and sociological
components of mental health with regard to the diagnosis of mental illness

Introduction
The diagnosis of mental illness has sometimes been a controversial issue due to concerns
about reliability and validity of diagnosis (Brown, 1987; Rosenhan, 1973; Mirowsky & Ross,
1989a). Current methods focus on the categorical assessment of condition through presented
symptoms, but unlike physical health issues, psychological problems are not discrete, presenting
instead along a continuum, and often not able to be verified through quantifiable evidence.
These issues make psychological problems difficult to point conclusively to causal factors in a
manner similar to physical health issues (Mirowsky & Ross, 1989a). In fact, mental health
symptoms can be extremely generic and are sometimes subject to interpretation by both the
practitioner and the patient. There is even some concern that mental illness might not actually be
a disease and instead is a sociologically constructed label of psychological conditions (Szasz,
1965). Some scientists even contend that a mental illness diagnosis can lead to stigmatization,
self-fulfilling behavior, and medicalization of social deviance (Rosenhan, 1973; Scheff, 2003).
Concurrently, the question is raised; is the categorical assessment of mental illness helpful in
treatment, or could an assessment and scoring of the factors correlated with defined mental
illness be a more helpful tool for identifying and treating poor mental health? This paper argues
that tracking and scoring of the factors known to correlate and associated with poor mental
health, rather than categorical diagnosis would lead to a better method of diagnosis and
understanding of mental illness in individuals. A brief overview of the three primary models of
mental illness is discussed first with a focus towards issues in the diagnosis of mental illness.
We then look at previous literature around the benefits and drawbacks to the dominant models
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and diagnosis of mental illness in general. Following this, a continued analysis of previous
literature around alternatives to categorical assessment of mental illness is explored and
discussed. Lastly, a proposed alternative to categorical diagnosis is proposed and future areas for
research discussed.
Models of Mental Illness
A discussion of diagnosis of mental illness cannot be had without first spending time
looking at the three models primarily used today to describe and define mental illness. All three
models have evidence to support their position but lend completely different, and sometimes
contrary, views of what shapes or defines mental illness. A brief overview of the three different
models -- medical, psychological, and social -- is discussed below with regard to diagnosis and
treatment of mental illness and with their respective limitations.
The Medical Model
The most prevalent model of mental illness is the medical model. Under the early
medical models of mental illness, symptoms of mental illness are the manifestations of specific
unseen organisms or lesions (Miroswky & Ross, 1989a). In 1965 an article was published by
Schildkraut that hypothesized that certain forms of depression could be caused by a chemical
imbalance in the brain. He hypothesized that some, or potentially all, forms of depression could
be related to a decrease in catecholamine, particularly norepinephrine. This article would
become known as the ‘Catecholamine Hypothesis’ and the basis for the updated bio-chemical
medical model of mental illness that is most prevalent today.
The bio-chemical medical model does have several limitations, the greatest is an inability
to show causality based on chemical imbalance. One could equally argue that the chemical
imbalances could be symptomatic of a disorder rather than the cause. Even Schildkraut
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concluded in his article, “It is not possible, therefore, to confirm definitively or to reject the
catecholamine hypothesis on the basis of data currently available.” (Schildkraut, 1965, p.522).
This problem can perhaps best be seen through the approval process of medications by the FDA
for psycho-pharmacology. In an article explaining the requirements for drug testing and
approval by the FDA, Katz (2004) discusses how the mechanism of action (MOA) of a drug is
secondary to drug approval. Instead the FDA focuses on the treatment in the reduction or
elimination of the symptoms, without the need for an understanding of the MOA of the drug.
Katz continues to explain how a complete understanding of the pathophysiology of a disease is
necessary to rely on a drug’s effect and states, “This knowledge is not available for any
neurologic or psychiatric condition with which the Agency deals, nor is it available for any of the
treatments approved (or regulated) by the Agency.” (Katz, 2004, p.315). This combined with
federal labeling laws (21 C.F.R. § 201.57) results in any drug used in the treatment of
psychological conditions carrying labeling stating, “the mechanisms of action are not fully
understood”, underscoring the lack of evidence or support of the bio-medical model of mental
illness even today.
Crucial to the argument for the bio-medical model is several assumptions. The first is
that the mind and mental functions can be reduced to biological functions of the brain. The
second is a universality of the brain, in that like other organs in the body, culture and social
context does not affect it (Horwitz, 2003). Thus a bio-medical model must be able to separate
physiological and genetic factors from environmental and cultural influences. Primarily studies
are done through the use of adoption studies, twin studies, and linkage studies. Horwitz (2003)
argues that the results of these types of studies have been inconclusive with the exception of
limited evidence of genetic causes of some forms of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. So
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while some psychological disorders have shown physiological evidence correlated with mental
illness, most do not; continuing to leave definitive evidence to support a bio-medical model.
The argument that mental illness does not fit with the medical model is not new having
been discussed in detail in the controversial book, The Myth of Mental Illness, by Dr. Thomas
Szasz (1961). In the first edition and later revisions, Szasz argues that psychiatrists diagnose and
label people, “disabled by living”, as mentally ill. Fundamentally, Szasz argues that people’s
mental health is transitional based on the experiences of everyday life. By labeling transitory
behaviors and emotions, people are pronounced as being sick for reactions that are normal and
part of the human condition. He continues to say that it is a logical error to equate mental health
with physical health and that most mental health conditions are really issues with emotions and
behaviors. This line of thinking actually is very consistent and in line with that of another big
name at the time, psychologist B.F. Skinner. Skinner believed that the inner workings of the
mind were not as important as the environment, experiences, and consequences of behavior
(Skinner, 1974). Skinner treated the mind as a ‘black box’, not concerned with the processes
within, and instead focused on the inputs and outputs using direct observation. Thus Skinner
also saw people as not being mentally ill but instead simply responding to stimuli and
experiences with no observable evidence to support the medical disease model of mental illness.
The Psychological Model
The second most prevalent model of mental illness focuses on the psychological state of
individuals. The debate of whether our psychological state is shaped from experiences or by
biological influences has been a deeply debated topic in psychology for decades1. Foundational

1

For a historical and philosophical look at the topic of the Nature vs Nurture debate, see Beyond Versus:

The Struggle to Understand the Interaction of Nature and Nurture by James Tabery, MIT Press, 2014.
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figures in the field of psychology (such as Locke and Skinner) argue that we are nothing more
than our experiences. Meanwhile evolutionary figures (such as Darwin, Lorenz, and Frisch)
argue we are more influenced by our genes. In the words of Eleanor Gibson (1994), the debate
over nature versus nurture is a “hobgoblin”. She argues that nature and nurture are inseparable
and that one cannot attribute causality to either one. Instead that to distinguish between the two
along a dimensional scale ignores that the there is always interaction between the two. Today
most scientists believe that the issue is not nature versus nurture but that it is a combination of
the two factors (Gibson, 1994). However, the psychological model of mental illness takes the
perspective that mental health is largely shaped more by environmental and experiential
influences rather than biological ones.
Like the medical model, the psychological model has the limitation of focus on treatment,
reduction, or elimination of symptoms. However, the psychological model looks to explain an
underlying reason for the thoughts, behaviors, and emotions through environmental or
experiential causes rather than biological ones. Several different schools of thought exist in this
process with little agreement or scientific evidence to support one approach conclusively. That
said, pioneering work in behaviorism by Watson and Skinner in the 1960s showed evidence that
learning, emotions, and much behavior, can be modified and regulated through environmental
and experiential stimuli (Skinner, 1974). These pioneering studies established the field of
behaviorism in Psychology and lead to several psychological models and treatment techniques.
One of the most popular treatments in mental health is that of Cognitive Behavioral
Therapy (CBT). CBT takes the theory that mental illness is caused by underlying cognitive
distortions and maladaptive behaviors. The theory states that by changing these underlying
thoughts and behaviors, mental health can be achieved. CBT is a well-researched treatment
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approach to mental illness, and has been shown to be particularly effective in treatment for
anxiety and depression disorders (Tolin, 2010). A recent meta-analysis further supported CBT
as more effective compared to traditional treatments, including medications, as evidenced by
reduced symptoms (Watts et al., 2015). This would lend evidence to support mental illness
might best be treated as behavioral (psychological) issues, rather than a medical issue.
Still, despite long standing scientific evidence that mental illness may best be treated and
explained as behavioral issues, the psychological model of mental illness appears to have
gradually fallen out of favor to the medical model. One reason for this could be the increasing
pressure on providers to use the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual (DSM) for diagnosis of mental illness. The DSM has gone through several versions
since introduction, with the DSM-III becoming the standardized tool in the use of diagnosis of
mental illness shortly after its introduction. A DSM diagnosis is frequently required by thirdparty payers (insurers) for billing, as is a diagnosis for use in reporting by governments. These
policy based requirements may have led even adamant believers in the psychological model of
mental illness to be forced to adopt the medical model for clinical and research procedures
(Brown, 1987).
In 1973, Rosenhan published the seminal article, “On Being Sane, in Insane Places”. In
it he made several observations around the treatment of the mentally ill but most importantly he
proposed that a diagnosis of mental illness is a label of social deviance. This article and the
work of Scheff in 1975 would help to develop the sociological perspective and models of mental
illness. From the sociological model, mental illness is not a disease but a violation of social
norms and moral standards (Scheff, 1975). Mental illness is viewed as an involuntary nonconformance rather than a choice. The sociological model shows evidence that mental illness
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could be both a socially constructed and socially contributed (stress) phenomenon rather than a
disease or psychological condition.
It should be noted that a major distinction between the sociological model and that of the
medical and psychological model is the role of the individual in their mental illness. Both the
medical model and the psychological model of mental illness place responsibility, or even blame,
on the individual; either through biology or behavior respectively. While the medical model
never changed this view, the publishing of Social Learning Theory by psychologist Albert
Bandura established the first evidence that behaviors of mental illness could be shaped by society
(1977). While the earlier behavioral theories of learning argued that all learning was the result of
associations formed by conditioning, reinforcement, and punishment, Bandura's social learning
theory proposed that learning can also occur by observing the actions of others (Bandura, 1977).
Today psychologists accept social learning theory as a source of many human behaviors,
including mental illness, by most psychologists. This shift in the psychological community
shows that there is a greater acceptance of the importance of the sociological model in mental
illness and that further exploration and research is needed.

Methodology
It is clear from an understanding of the three models of mental illness and their
limitations that a focus on symptoms -- exhibited thoughts, feelings, or behaviors -- is not an
ideal method for assessment of mental health. Additionally, when viewed from a sociological
perspective, there appears to be many issues around the diagnosis of mental illness in general.
These issues might point to the need for another method of diagnosis of mental illness or
measurement of mental health. One alternative method could be the assessment of the genetic,
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environmental, physiological, and even sociological factors known to correlate with poor mental
health. If common or discrete factors related to poor mental health were able to be identified and
correlated with various psychological conditions, these factors could then be used to help
diagnosis those associated conditions. Thus, someone exhibiting many factors statistically
correlated to a particular psychological condition could be just as easily diagnosed with the
condition by these factors rather than generic symptoms2. Since these factors need not
necessarily be discrete, they can overlap, or even contradict allowing for assessment along the
broad spectrum of the human condition. Additionally, based on statistical analysis of these
factors, an index along a continuum of mental health could be established allowing for
quantifiable observation of mental health without categorical ‘bright-lines’.
To explore this hypothesis an analysis of literature related to diagnosis of mental illness
through categorical assessment, the dominant model in use today, against alternatives was
performed. Initial research focused on authors associated with each of the three models of
mental illness. From there, an evaluation of citations of these works was performed across
academic databases in the fields of medicine, psychology, and sociology. Searching of medical
databases primarily focused on the subfield of psychiatry and neuroscience although no effort
was made to restrict queries to these areas. Search terms typically included the following words
and phrases: categorical assessment, diagnosis, DSM, limitations, measurement, mental
illness, and mental health. Search results were then sorted by relevance as determined by the
various databases. Additionally, since the topic of criticisms of the DSM has grown during the

2

It should be noted that even a strong correlation and ability to match a psychological condition from factors would

not establish causality for these factors in poor mental health. However, if treatments for factors can be shown to
cause therapeutic effects, it would be the first step in conclusively identifying causes of mental illness.
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process of the creation and publication of the DSM 5 several books on this topic were
additionally evaluated.

Literary Review
Benefits of the Categorical (DSM) diagnosis method. There are several benefits to a
categorical diagnosis system such as the American Psychiatric Association’s DSM. The most
important is the standardization of communication between providers, clients, and institutions.
Because categorical diagnosis is binary, either present or not, it makes some tasks easier such as
decisions on payment for services, or whether a subject should be included in a research group.
There is also argument that through standardization of criteria in research, peer replication and
review is simplified and less prone to errors or conflicting results. However, many of these
benefits could be possible with other assessment methodologies as well and are not exclusive to
categorical assessments.

Problems with Categorical (DSM) diagnosis. The DSM has not been without criticism
as both a tool for the diagnosis of mental illness and as a tool for defining of psychological
conditions. Even the earliest editions showed signs of problems with validity and reliability, as
pointed out by Rosenhan (1973). However, some recent studies of the reliability of the DSM-IV
have indicated that it has shown some reliability in diagnosis of anxiety and mood disorders
(Brown et al., 2001).

However, there still appears to be a lack of scientific evidence of the

validity of diagnosis when compared to competing diagnostic tools such as the International
Classification of Disease, version 10 (ICD-10). This is further evidenced in how diagnosis can
create conflict between providers, institutions, and public health policy. Even as early as the
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DSM-III, Brown (1987) found that mandatory use of categorical assessment led to problems with
inter-rater reliability, “beating the system” with selective diagnosis, and joking or arguments
about inclusion of certain behavioral conditions as disorders among providers. He noted that
clinicians and supervisors frequently complained about the effect of billing and governmental
policies requiring DSM diagnosis codes as unduly influencing medical decisions. Several
clinicians stated frustration that they often had to make decisions based on social factors, such as
coding to allow someone to receive treatment from a provider, following strict procedures, or
even altering a diagnosis to prevent repercussions to clients.

Criticism of Diagnosis in General. The latest edition of the DSM has driven the most
controversy with several books denouncing it from several positions. Although there has been
much criticism, a majority of it focuses on the concept of medicalization popularized by Peter
Conrad (2007). Conrad argues that the medical community, and in particular the American
Psychiatric Association, have engaged in the defining and labeling of deviant behavior as a
medical problem. He argues this shifts deviance into a medical issue which needs to be treated
in the name of health, creating a new form of social control. While this concept is not a new
accusation, remembering that Szasz first proposed this decades earlier, what Conrad suggests is
that the rate of inclusion of new disorders and the labeling of common human conditions has
increased exponentially and is partially driven by connections between the drug industry and
those involved in the creation of the DSM (Conrad, 2007).
Perhaps the most impressive critic of the expansion of the DSM and opponent to the
process of medicalization is M.D. Frances Allen. Allen was the chair-person for the task force
that produced the fourth edition of the DSM (DSM-IV). As someone intimately familiar with the
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DSM and the process of its creation, Allen argues that the new DSM 5 takes medicalization to
the extreme with characterization of common human conditions as mental illness that require
medical treatment. He contends that, despite massive amounts of criticizing and rising concerns
about medicalization voiced to the APA, the DSM 5 was published with several disorders he
proposes will encapsulate common life conditions. In his book he cites several of these new
disorders and how they fit everyday situations. For instance he says that grief will become
“Major Depressive Disorder”, memory issues seen in the elderly become “Mild Neurocognitive
Disorder”, and loss of temper in children is a “Disruptive Mood Dysregulation Disorder”. He
points to people with gastronomical gluttony as being diagnosed with the new “Binge Eating
Disorder”, and even shows that merely being worried about becoming ill will lead to a diagnosis
of “Somatic Symptom Disorder”.
Allen also raises serious concerns over the expansion of existing diagnoses in the DSM.
He argues that the expansion of Attention Deficit Disorder (A.D.D.) for adults will qualify most
of the population for the prescription of medications with known adverse side-effects such as
loss of weight, increased blood pressure and heart rate, and anxiety. The possibility of an
expansion in diagnosis with regards to increased ability to prescribe medicine was also raised by
Cosgrove, Krimsky, Vijayaraghava, and Lisa Schneider in findings of strong financial ties
between the pharmaceutical industry and DSM panel members. Allen (2013) hints at this same
conclusion stating that the use of the medication has little to no scientific evidence to treat
A.D.D. for adults and has high chances of abuse. However, Dr. Allen’s greatest concern is that
with the increasing diagnosis and treatment of all these new disorders, those with true
psychological conditions that desperately need help will become neglected while the “worried
well” patients will receive unnecessary treatments at their own behest (Allen, 2013).
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Mirowsky and Ross describe another issue with the diagnosis of mental illness as the
confusion between labeling symptoms of mental illness, such as thoughts and behaviors, and the
labeling of the unknown and unseen cause. As an example, they argue that by diagnosing
someone with schizophrenia you have not only labeled their behavior but -- in keeping with a
medical model caused by disease -- also labeled the unknown cause of this disorder. They
remind us that while thoughts and behaviors are real and observable, there is currently no
observable evidence of the cause of schizophrenia (1989a). They continue and argue that one
should disregard behaviors as attributes of the human condition similar to height, weight, or age,
and not hold them representative of symptoms of illness. Stated another way, behaviors are
correlated with illness but are not representative of an illness in such a way to systematically and
accurately diagnosis illness. Categorizing behaviors as illness would be similar to defining and
diagnosing heart disease based solely on weight, height, and age, without looking at true factors
linked with causation such as blood pressure, cholesterol, diet, and lack of exercise.
As an example of how medicalization and labeling of common human conditions as
psychological health issues could get out of hand, Mirowsky and Ross engage in a hypothetical
thought exercise for an emergence of a new disorder called “dysprosperia”. In this exercise, they
propose a group of sociologists want to describe the psychological conditions associated with
poverty using a new universal term. They coin the term “dysprosperia” and eventually the term
through citations might find its way into medical literature. As the term originated for
simplifying communication between others in the field of sociology becomes increasingly used
in the medical community, it could take on a new meaning by becoming linked to health
conditions and ultimately even become a new medical disorder. Researchers would soon be able
to scientifically show potential biological subtypes based on race such as dysprosperia Negra,
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dysprosperia Latina. Soon several drug companies announce plans to market drugs for the
disorder pending FDA approval, and while they are unable to cite evidence the drugs cure the
disorder (poverty), they can “provide effective means of controlling distress, hostility,
aggression, and criminal proclivities associated with it”. They continue that, within 10 years, a
Presidential commission would conclude that dysprosperia is one of America’s greatest health
problems (Mirowsky & Ross, 1989b). While this all seems clearly illogical and preposterous
their predictions closely mimic events around the inclusion of female sexual dysfunction
disorders in the DSM-IV and DSM 5 (Horwitz, 2003).
The most radical argument against diagnosis of mental illness came from the British
author and psychiatrist, R.D Laing. In his book, The Politics of Experience, he challenges the
entire premise of mental illness; taking a stance that what society deems mentally ill might
actually be a sign of “supersanity”. He continues the argument that mental illness is a social
construction and proposes that the insane may actually be attuned to or aware of things society is
not and it is wrong to view them as inferior, even arguing they may be superior in many ways
(Laing, 1967).

Beyond Diagnosis, Problems with Labeling and Stigma. Criticisms of the DSM aside,
another problem exists with categorical diagnosis of mental illness in general. As previously
mentioned by several sociologists, a mental illness diagnosis can become a label with
consequences (Rosenhan, 1973). It has also been argued that a mental illness diagnosis is
selectively applied to the weak by the powerful, establishing a labeling of a role imposed by
others. This assigned role through social influence and societal control can lead to mental illness
becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy (Scheff, 1975). Evidence of this selective application of
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labeling can be seen through the work of Ronson in his book, “The Psychopath Test”. In it,
Ronson discusses how 1 out of 100 people are estimated to qualify as a psychopath; exhibiting
qualities including lack of empathy, manipulating people through charming, deceitful, seductive
behavior, and exhibiting signs of delusion. Throughout the book Ronson explores the concept of
high-functioning psychopaths not only avoiding a diagnosis and labeling, but actually excelling
in society and being rewarded for their behavior. As an example he looks at the possibility that
many of the United States Fortune 500 CEOs actually meet the criteria to be diagnosed as
psychopaths. He points to how many are responsible for acts of massive fraud, corruption, and
showed lack of empathy while shutting down factories and eliminating jobs (Ronson, 2012).
Conversely, if someone of lesser SES were to engage in massive fraud, corruption, or displayed
total lack of empathy it is more likely they would be caught and diagnosed as a psychopath. This
selective application of labeling shows how inequities apply in the diagnosis of mental illness
and how media and societal perspectives affect the perception of the mentally ill.
Labeling has also been linked to stigma associated with mental illness. In a study
by Bruce G. Link, Francis T. Cullen, Elmer Struening, Patrick E. Shrout and Bruce P.
Dohrenwend (1989) it was found that mentally ill people are discriminated and devalued by
others including providers and even other mentally ill. They found that this stigma is a
socialized and learned behavior from a young age and those seeking help may be aware of it
prior to seeking help. This stigma and discrimination can discourage the mentally ill from
seeking help as well as engage in behaviors to help deal with the stigma such as engaging in
secrecy, withdrawal, or educating themselves and others to try and mitigate the stigma (Link et
al.1989). This stigma can be so pervasive that providers and even those who themselves are
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diagnosed with mental illness can share in the stereotyped perceptions and discrimination (Link
et al., 1989).
Arguments that labeling theory and stigmatization have not been shown to be as clearly
linked to mental illness also exist. This includes disagreement with the conclusion that the lower
class are more readily given a diagnosis. Walter Gove (1979) showed this through evidence of
greater numbers of patients being treated and receiving diagnosis in wealthier or higher SES.
Gove also contented there was no evidence of experiencing lasting stigma and that those with
mental illness have a condition separate from how they are labeled. In many cases the condition
relates to social factors such as SES, race, gender, and access to support and services (Gove,
1979). This fact supports the argument of critics against categorical assessment of mental
illness, pointing to the need for a different mechanism of diagnosis which can fully attribute for
these other conditions.

The Issue of Context. Another central argument to concerns of categorical assessment of
mental health is related to the context surrounding symptoms. By drawing “bright lines” and
forcing a categorical assessment – mainly to assist in producing reliability in assessment -details from context around a person’s life are lost. This context can help to differentiate
between symptoms of illness and symptoms normal based on normal life experiences. For
instance, the death of a loved one is a severely traumatic experience, albeit a normal part of most
people’s lives. However, despite arguments that the providers shall take this context into
account, often diagnosis of Clinical Depression will be made along with prescription of
medications. Critics contend that the influential sway of the pharmaceutical industry has resulted
in greater numbers of diagnoses, paving way for the prescribing of more medications
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(Greenberg, 2014). While one can argue that this fault lies in providers, an increasing number of
providers point to patients asking for a diagnosis or medications based on societal acceptance of
the medicalization process and an increase in the direct to consumer marketing (Conrad, 2007).
There is also the aspect of authority and trust that patients have in their providers allowing them
to easily accept a diagnosis and recommendations for medical treatment.

Alternatives to Categorical Diagnosis. As has already been discussed, the focus of the
categorical assessment and diagnosis raises many problems. While the creation and expansion of
the DSM has firmly established categorical assessment of mental illness, it is not universally
accepted. As early as 1989, Mirowsky and Ross were critical of categorical assessment and the
DSM-III. In their paper, they express doubt that a medical model is appropriate for diagnosis of
mental illness; stressing that behaviors such as depression, schizophrenia, and paranoia are
human attributes similar to weight, height, and age. They go on to suggest that similar to these
attributes it makes sense to index based on dimension rather than attempt to categorize based on
“fuzzy and non-discrete” assessment (Mirowsky & Ross, 1989b, p.38).
Kirk and Kutchins do acknowledge that categorical assessment has benefits for
governmental organizations and insurance companies in simplifying and standardizing
procedures and reporting (Kirk & Kutchins, 1992). However, they question if these benefits
justify the expansion and forced use for clinical assessment and treatment. Asking how the
labeling of a condition has any effect on its treatment, Kirk and Kutchins, suggested that by
trying to make people fit into preset boxes, providers lose the individual differences that may be
critical to personalized care. Additionally, Kirk and Kutchins questioned the usefulness of
categorical assessment in clinical research as well. They point to the exclusion of people from
samples and difficulties in qualifying participants in studies based on arbitrary qualifications.
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They assert that by carefully limited participation in studies, results can be skewed or not
representative of larger more diverse make up of others with similar psychological issues. These
concerns are now being heard and policies requiring the use of the DSM for funding of National
Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) are being changed. In a posting in the APA Monitor on
Psyhcology, author Winerman (2013) details how NIMH says that the Federal agency will be
moving away from funding research based on DSM categories. The APA in response stated that
while the DSM shall remain the gold-standard for clinical diagnosis, “what may be realistically
feasible today for practitioners is no longer sufficient for researchers.” (Winerman, 2013). This
announcement from the APA seems to indicate that they now appear to be in agreement with
some of their earliest critics and admit that categorical assessment has limitations.
Another example of the need to move towards dimensional assessment of components of
psychological conditions lies in the medicalization of obesity. Eating Disorders have a long
history in the DSM and characterize certain eating behaviors as a disease. However, these
“diseases” unequally affect the population primarily being diagnosed in wealthy white women.
The opposite is true with obesity, a medical condition defined as having a body mass index
greater than 30(NHS). Obesity, is directly related to a person’s height, weight, age, and other
factors. Measuring of these factors is easily done and has been done by the medical community
for decades. However, with the inclusion of “Binge Eating Disorder” in the DSM 5, several
have argued that obesity has become closer to a mental illness. Things become even more
socially constructed and confusing when you look at media portrayal of eating disorders, with
Anorexia and Bulimia portrayed as a disease, while obesity is described as an individual’s
medical problem caused by their own actions. Little discussion of the sociological components
of obesity such as access SES, diet, and access to recreational resources or exercise, enters

DIAGNOSIS OF MENTAL ILLNESS TODAY AND TOMORROW

20

discussions on the medical validity of the “disease”. All of this points to the failings of the
categorical assessment and the medical model and the need for alternatives.

Standardized Indexes. Perhaps as a response to criticisms over categorical assessment,
the APA as early as the DSM-III included a concept of a continuum score of mental health. This
was done using a “Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) Scale” from 0 to 100 of overall
mental health and recorded as one value for the five axis system of diagnosis (DSM-IV, p. 32).
The multiaxial system actually resulted in providers having to provide five assessments for every
client along allegedly distinct axes. The first two axes were for “principal disorder” and
“personality disorder”. The third axis was to allow for providers to code for physiological
conditions related to the client’s mental health. Finally, the fourth axis would represent for other
“psychosocial factors” such as divorce, job-loss, or loss of spouse.
The distinction between Axis-I principle disorder and Axis-II for personality disorders
was frequently confusing for providers, even being acknowledged as such by the APA (APA,
2013, p.1). So while the APA provided for the ability to assess a scaled index of mental health
from 0 to 100, it provided little direction in how it was to be used, and was never required to be
used during diagnosis. There is evidence that the new axis system of the DSM-IV did show
increased reliability between providers (Hilsenroth et al., 2000). However, it was so poorly
utilized and frequently seen as “redundant” or “arbitrary” that the APA removed it from the
DSM 5 with little comment or any chance of feedback by the industry.
As part of the publication of DSM 5 the APA published a two page flyer entitled,
“Personality Disorders” (APA, 2013). In it were a few brief statements explaining the purpose
of the multiaxial system and why it was no longer needed. Specifically, the APA stated the
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multiaxial system was: “introduced in part to solve a problem that no longer exists: Certain
disorders, like personality disorders, received inadequate clinical and research focus. As a
consequence, these disorders were designated to Axis II to ensure they received greater
attention.” (APA, 2013, p.1). Additionally in responding to criticisms that there was no
meaningful difference in the distinction between personality disorders and ‘principle disorders’
the APA felt the axis system became unnecessary in the DSM-5 combining the first three axes
outlined in past editions, while dropping ‘psychosocial’ and the GAF altogether. The APA
explains in the same flyer that grouping all mental and other medical diagnoses was a benefit as:
“Doing so removes artificial distinctions among conditions … benefiting both clinical practice
and research use.” (APA, 2013, p.2).
With the APA moving away from continuous measurements on a continuum (GAF) and
removing evaluation of “psychosocial” factors, it would seem that there is a perceived lack of
value in utility for diagnosis in this information. However, one must evaluate if the APA was
trying to ‘have its cake and eat it too’ in earlier editions by focusing on categorical assessment
but including the AXIS system to address criticisms. In light of the comments by the APA with
the removal of the APA axis system it would not be hard to conclude that the inclusion of axis-II
enabled the inclusion of controversial conditions (personality disorders) by distinguishing them
from the more commonly accepted principal conditions. Similarly, the addition of Axis-IV for
“psychosocial” conditions would address critics that sociological and contextual conditions are
critical to understanding of mental health, and Axis-V (GAF) provided for an index score of
mental health. Thus it seems the APA has been able to silence critics by establishing themselves
as the standard for diagnosis through compromise, only to go back and remove those
compromises later.
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Despite the APA’s rejection of both sociological factors and the GAF, moving away from
categorical assessment to continuous measurements on a continuum looks like a promising
alternative. Besides being directly measurable / observable, this would reduce the arbitrary
nature of cutoffs and ‘bright-lines’ in assessments (Kutchins & Kirk, 1992). Having
measurement of factors outside of individual’s control, including social factors, could be
implemented easily and aid in both research and diagnosis. For instance, tracking an individual’s
SES with regard to mental health might show that certain psychological conditions are more
heavily associated with certain portions of the population. Because the index is continuous
participants in studies would need not be excluded because their SES doesn’t fit into a specific
category allowing studies to be more diverse while still providing valuable data. This
inclusiveness of all data addresses an issue referred to by Mirowski and Ross (1989a) as
“reducing the signal but not the noise”. They pointed out that diagnosis under a categorical
system requires the collection of data and then the ignoring of most of it. A continuum does not
have this issue and allows one to establish criteria appropriate to the study.3
Most importantly, these measurements could even help to point towards likely causes of
mental illness. Providing evidence of causation is not easy, particularly in conditions with as
many variables as mental health, however, use of continuous and multiple distinct indexes could
help. Since these indexes can be continuously tracked over the course of treatments or the
lifespan of individuals or groups studies can more easily be designed allowing better regression
or causal inference. Scientific peer review and replication should also remain easier by

3

Of course, one must establish their criteria prior to collecting their data to avoid confirmation bias in analysis of

data and should be able to defend their decisions among their peers.
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increasing the number of qualified participants and bridging between medical, psychological,
and sociological fields.
Rosenfield’s application of “modified labeling theory” provides evidence that factors
such as stigma, quality of services, a person’s decision making power, and supportive
interactions, all relate to mental illness and treatment (1997). This continues to suggest these
factors should be tracked and indexed as part of patient care. Other social components related to
mental illness have been shown as well including sex (Ferraro & Nuriddin, 2006) and race
(Gaines, 2007).
Multifactor analysis of psychological distress and well-being shows much promise as
well. Masse’ et al. (1998) showed that measurements along a ‘well-being continuum’ combining
factors such as access to a good job, social life, support network, and adequate living conditions,
proved to be distinct from physiological distress. Evidence was found that psychological
distress, when also measured along a continuum, and analyzed alongside the well-being
continuum, allowed for the distinguishing between depression from anxiety and depression from
other disorders (Massé et al., 1998). This evidence further supports the need and validity for
continuum in research and assessment of clients. Whelan (1994) also found that psychological
stress can be predicted through sociological factors. In his analysis of survey data from 3294
households it was found that the largest determining factor of psychological stress was
unemployment and economic depression. Again, this points to the need to measure economic
and social factors in the assessment of mental health.
Another benefit of multiple indexes is the ability to perform multifactor analysis.
Multifactor analysis can easily be achieved by adding or removing factors from indexes, or
through regression. Through the standardization of the content of these indexes repeatability and
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validity can be achieved while still allowing for simple use of statistical tools and high reliability.
As more data and studies are conducted the validity of the indexes can be refined and even past
study data can be easily updated to be used for longitudinal studies.

Conclusion
Given the concern and limitations inherent in the current method of diagnosis of mental
illness, it is evident that alternative methods of diagnosis need to be researched. Based on both
current and historical literature, it seems likely that categorical assessment should be
discontinued for the use of diagnosis or treatment of individuals due to the negative effects
documented over half a century. The most promising ideas appear to lie around the creation of
new standardized indexes of factors known connected to mental health. As an example; indexes
for social factors (social support, socioeconomic status (SES), access to medical care,
employment), physiological factors (family history of mental illness, gender, sex, diet, sleep) and
behavioral factors (sleep hygiene, functional ability, coping skills, recreational activities) seem
like appropriate starting points. The continuums need not limit diagnosis to “cutoff points” but
instead would help to portray a more useful “dashboard of mental health” to providers and
patients alike even enabling trending analysis easily. Unlike categorical assessments, areas of
deficit can clearly be seen and tracked with treatments able to be customized to focus on each
patient’s unique situation. Treatments should focus on reducing index scores through evidence
based models which include treatment of all correlated factors, including those factors outside of
the individual’s direct control such as SES, education, access to medical care or other support.
It might be common in the future to see your mental health professional and discuss your
dashboard reflecting working long hours without any recreational time or lack of eating healthy
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meals and have a greater concern for your mental health around these environmental factors
rather than your explosive argument with a coworker. Thus common human behavior and
psychological events can be discussed in terms of overall mental health and not characterized as
disorders such as Temper Dysregulation Disorder. Furthermore, this enables providers to first
try non-medical treatments before moving to more costly, risky, and invasive medical treatments.
This approach fits well with the growing interest in the medical community for more holistic
approaches to health and lifestyle.
That is not to say that categorical assessment should be stopped completely, as it has been
shown to be helpful in standardizing communication between providers, governments, and
industry. In fact; the new continuum indexes could be consolidated into categorized totals
enabling quick communication and comparisons helping to drive more informative policy
decisions around mental health. However, categorical assessment should be constrained to factor
analysis in defining conditions instead of social construction methods open to
mischaracterization or even possible corruption. With new definitions based on factor analysis,
or other statistical methods of directly observable factors, continued use in research could
continue to be used for prevalence rates, treatment rates, and generalized comparisons. By
limiting the use of categorical assessment and basing comparisons off statistical analysis it seems
possible to offer more consistent communication without risk of labeling or stigmatization.
After concerns about the dangers of categorical assessment of mental illness were
raised almost fifty years ago, only recently has greater criticism started to energize around a
potential crisis in human health. More research needs to be done on the idea of continuum based
assessment of overall mental health, versus the traditional medical model of mental illness as a
disease. Likewise, evidence from the field of sociology has shown that direct links between
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health and society cast doubt on the individual as the sole factor proposed by the psychological
model of mental illness. It is believed that with additional research and a growing macroenvironmental and experiential view of mental health, better forms of diagnosis and focus of
treatment can be achieved.
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